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BARRIERS TO FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
FOR ARTISTS IN THE RECORDING INDUSTRY
IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Kai N. Le
Dr. Paul Majeske, Mentor
ABSTRACT
For decades, consumers, due to frequent technological
advances, have utilized a variety of music-listening processes that have
each become obsolete as more easily accessible technologies emerged.
This change in music consumption methods is often detrimental to
parties in the recording industry. The digitalization of the recording
industry has allowed consumers to obtain music through means
other than physical purchase, leading to well-documented financial
insecurity for artists (Eiriz & Leite, 2017). In 2018, the Music Industry
Research Association (MIRA) conducted a survey of 1,227 musicians
and found that 61% of the group agreed that their music-related income
is not enough to cover their living expenses (MIRA, 2018). For this
reason, frequent attempts to deter widespread copyright infringement
have been made. However, the aggressive litigation strategy of the
recording industry and the development of streaming services as a
viable music consumption method have instead decreased sales and
negatively impacted artists’ revenue from the recording industry
(Fedock, 2005; Marshall, 2015).
INTRODUCTION
With the creation of the MP3 format and peer-to-peer
file sharing during the 1990s, the growth of Internet music piracy
accelerated significantly. Peer-to-peer file sharing allows consumers
to download and share copyrighted works uploaded by other users
on a peer-to-peer network. Napster, Inc., a popular peer-to-peer
file sharing service, posed a great threat to the recording industry
by enabling this unregulated exchange of music between consumers
(David, 2010). By May of 1999, consumers could utilize Napster to
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listen to music on the platform, but they could also register for an
account that allowed them to freely download content not in their
possession (Gopal, Sanders, Bhattacharjee, Agrawal, & Wagner, 2004).
For this reason, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA), a trade group representing the recording industry, assisted
several recording companies in suing Napster, alleging contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement (Berschadsky, 2000). Filed on
December 9, 1999, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. was the first
major case to apply copyright laws to peer-to-peer file sharing and
combat Internet music piracy in a newly-transformed market. The
court found that peer-to-peer file sharing services were liable for
copyright infringement, but subsequent lawsuits were less favorably
received, for, instead of holding sharing services liable, they targeted
individual file sharers. The focus of this literature review is to explore
the significant challenges that have contributed to revenue decline for
artists in the United States’ recording industry.
Brief History of Copyright Law
Intellectual property may be described as “creations of the
mind, such as inventions; literary and artistic works; designs; and
symbols, names and images used in commerce” (World Intellectual
Property Organization, n.d.). In the United States, the law grants
owners of intellectual property exclusive rights to their original works
or ideas. Intellectual property protections offer artists a number of
rights that help control the circulation of ideas throughout society,
including copyrights and other protections of literary and artistic
expression (Field, 2006).
Modern copyright law first arose in the early 1700s after
legislation was passed to protect the works of intellectual property
owners. In 1710, the Statute of Anne was written in England as a
response to the rampant unauthorized publication of authors’ works
throughout the country (Kretschmer, 2000). For this reason, early
English authors were often deprived of financial compensation for
their intellectual property. The Statute of Anne prohibited printing
guilds and other parties from duplicating and distributing authors’
works without their consent (Statute of Anne, 1710). Further, the
English approach to safeguarding intellectual property served as an
early model for the United States’ copyright legislation.
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The U.S. Congress established the nation’s very first copyright
law in the late 1700s (Kretschmer, 2000). The U.S. Constitution sought
“To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). This
legislation paved the way for the Copyright Act of 1790, but this act
had significant limitations, as it only secured “the copies of maps,
chart, and book, to the authors and proprietors of such copies” in its
encouragement of learning (Copyright Act of 1790). In the following
decades, lawmakers made several revisions to this legislation to
extend the terms of protection and to offer such protections to works
that were not included in the nation’s earliest federal copyright laws,
such as both written and recorded musical works (Cummings, 2010).
The Copyright Act of 1909 was enacted to offer protection
to the authors of musical works. This act conferred upon copyright
owners the exclusive right to reproduce as well as perform their works
in public (Copyright Act of 1909). According to the United States
Copyright Office (USCO), a phonorecord is defined as “a material
object in which sounds are fixed…and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device” (USCO, 2018). The reproduction
right gives copyright owners the specific right to solely reproduce
their original composition (written music) and sound recordings
(recorded performance of music) in phonorecords (Hanus, 2018).
Correspondingly, the reproduction right prohibits anyone other than
the copyright owner from producing phonorecords (i.e., records,
cassette tapes, and CDs) of both compositions and sound recordings.
In addition to extending protection to all original works of authorship,
the Copyright Act of 1909 also devised a compulsory licensing
system, which aided artists in obtaining financial compensation for
reproductions, such as cover recordings of their original composition
recordings (Copyright Act of 1909).
Despite these developments, the Copyright Act of 1909 failed
to address initially unreleased sound recordings, and, as a result, these
did not receive copyright protection for decades (Cummings, 2010).
Consumers could copy and share sound recordings, such as those on
records, without infringing on their copyright. American copyright
law was limited until the 1970s, when drastic reform addressed artists’
lack of protections for sound recordings.
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Widespread illegal copying of musical works occurred
in the U.S. after the 1960s. As tape cassettes and cartridges
became a mass consumer good in America, illegal recording and
distribution of concert performances followed (Cummings, 2010).
The Copyright Act of 1976 was written to combat the rampant
piracy observed throughout the United States by increasing the
scope of works that were protected, extending their protection
term length, and addressing copyright infringement, registration,
and fair use of original works (Copyright Act of 1976). Despite this
drastic revision of copyright law, artists were still denied adequate
protection of their sound recordings until later in the twentieth
century.
A limited public performance right for the digital
streaming of copyrighted sound was granted by the Digital
Performance Right in the Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (LaFrance,
2002). Shortly afterward, this right was refined and expanded in
the U.S. by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (USCO, 1998).
Following the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act,
further reform was needed to address the increasing availability of
new digitalized music formats that complicated the future of the
recording industry yet again.
Approved in 1992 by the Moving Picture Experts Group,
the digital music format MP3 is an international standard for
encoding and compressing audio (Garofalo, 1999). In past decades,
consumers were limited to solely sharing physical forms of music
(i.e., records, cassette tapes, and CDs) and burdened by constraints
such as time, money, and other inconvenient aspects of creating
and sharing pirated products (Koh, Murthi, & Raghunathan, 2014).
The use of MP3 digital technology enabled consumers to duplicate
music with more efficiency (Marshall, 2005), paving the way for
rampant illegal sharing of copyrighted works and threatening the
profits of artists of the recording industry.
Music piracy, or the illegal distribution of copyrighted
music, poses a significant threat to creative industries (Chiou,
Huang, & Lee, 2005). Music piracy has posed a challenge to artists
since the late nineteenth century, when competitors discovered
how to copy recordings using Thomas Edison’s phonograph
technology (Cummings, 2010). Despite the prevalence of piracy
throughout history, the rise of MP3, paired with the growth of the
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Internet, allowed consumers to share music illegally on a much
larger scale than before. For this reason, the recording industry
has been aggressive in finding effective ways to combat piracy.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Litigation of Music Piracy
Aggressive litigation. The availability of MP3-formatted
music and peer-to-peer file sharing services enabled consumers to
engage in music piracy more easily. Within a few short months after
Napster’s release, the service rose to popularity and accumulated five
million registered users, many of whom used the file sharing system to
download copyrighted music for free (Musgrove & Thomason, 2000).
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. was an attempt to control this
unregulated exchange of music on peer-to-peer file sharing services
(A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001). In May 2000, the court
found Napster violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(DMCA) and called for the complete removal of copyrighted works,
thus beginning the demise of the service (Gopal et al., 2004).
Litigation damages sales and public opinion of the
recording industry. Soon after the RIAA sued Napster, Inc. for
facilitating Internet music piracy, the RIAA sought further action
against copyright infringement. In January of 2003, the RIAA
filed suit against Verizon, a leading Internet Service Provider (ISP)
and won (Electronic Privacy Information Center, n.d.). Using
the DMCA, the RIAA forced Verizon to release the identities, via
IP (Internet Protocol) address, of Internet service subscribers
suspected of digital music theft (Fedock, 2005). Verizon appealed,
arguing that the subpoenas sent to ISPs did not fall under the
extraordinary subpoena authority of the DMCA (Bhattacharjee,
Gopal, Lertwachara, & Marsden, 2006). The courts rejected this
argument, and Verizon lost the appeal. Soon afterward, the RIAA
began to serve the subpoenas with power granted by section 512(h)
(Goel, Miesing, & Chandra, 2010).
The DMCA was intended to combat online copyright
infringement. One method of the DMCA, the criminalization of
the “circumvention of technological measures used by copyright
owners to protect their works,” places restrictions on the intellectual
47
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properties that made illegal file sharing more difficult for infringers
(USCO, 1998, p. 2). In addition to anti-circumvention provisions,
lawmakers added section 512, a clause addressing online copyright
infringement, to the DMCA. Service providers were made liable for
infringement conducted on their servers, unless the service provider
qualified for limitations of liability, under the DMCA, to deter illegal
file sharing. Section 512(h) grants copyright owners, or those acting
on their behalf, the right to litigate against individual users by serving
service providers with subpoenas that call for the identification of the
alleged infringers (Zilkha, 2009). Although lawmakers attempted to
return power to the owners of digital works by creating the DMCA
and section 512(h), the legislation was ultimately abused by the
recording industry through the use of subpoenas and litigation against
individual end-users (Bhattacharjee et al., 2006).
In September of 2003, the RIAA filed over 200 lawsuits using
subpoenas issued by section 512(h); Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF, 2008). As a result of a lack of judicial oversight throughout the
subpoena process, the RIAA pursued maximum statutory damages
against alleged file sharers, hoping to promote public observance
of copyright law (Sag, 2016). Individuals accused of sharing music
illegally were forced to settle suits for thousands of dollars because
fighting the accusations in court would have been more expensive
than paying the fines (EFF, 2008). The RIAA subpoenaed children,
grandparents, and deceased people accused of file sharing, often
seeking as much as $150,000 in damages (Fogarty, 2008). The
RIAA sought to collect significant sums of money as well as public
apologies from the defendants, regardless of the defendant’s financial
limitations or the context of the initial file sharing (EFF, 2008; Sag,
2016). The RIAA sued individual infringers in an attempt to dissuade
and eventually end Internet music piracy; they incurred significant
legal fees from the lawsuits, while Internet music piracy continued to
escalate (EFF, 2008; Fogarty, 2008).
The RIAA acknowledged that filing lawsuits against
individual file sharers was both impractical and ineffective in
preventing Internet music piracy. Further, the relentless targeting of
file sharers conducted by the RIAA significantly damaged the public’s
opinion of the recording industry. Consumers were dissuaded from
purchasing music, fearing the legal actions of the RIAA, which
targeted individual file sharers including children, teenagers, and
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grandparents (Choi & Perez, 2007). To illustrate, David Draiman, a
popular rock vocalist from the band Disturbed, argued that “Instead
of spending all this money litigating against kids who are the people
they’re trying to sell things to in the first place, they have to learn how
to effectively use the Internet” (Selvin & Chonin, 2003, para. 4). Wang
and McClung (2011) noted that, although threatening file sharers
with lawsuits and fines can be effective, legal actions such as these can
also inspire defensive reactions that may lead to a boomerang effect,
a strong opposing response caused by attempts to restrict a person’s
freedom or change their attitudes. Mitchell, Scott, and Brown (2018)
found that, instead of benefiting the recording industry, “the RIAA’s
model of litigation actually backfired and led to decreased legitimate
album sales” (p. 59). Mitchell et al. (2018) used Nielsen’s SoundScan,
a database of weekly song and album sales, to track monthly album
sales from January of 1994 to December of 2014. Their findings
support the notion that the legal actions of the RIAA were responsible
for a decline in annual per capita album sales.
In addition to a loss of sales, the lawsuits did little to help the
artists that the RIAA claimed to be defending. Following the copyright
settlements, artists’ managers sought to collect money on behalf of
their clients, but literature highlights how money collected by the RIAA
from peer-to-peer settlements was paid to compensate artists (EFF,
2008). Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) found that the increased cost of the
lawsuit campaigns took a significant toll on RIAA. Correspondingly,
labels struggled with the depletion of settlement money after their
legal expenses were recouped. Further, Rainie and Madden (2004)
conducted a web survey exploring copyright and music sharing with
2,755 musician and songwriter participants. They found that 60% of
the sample of artists agreed that the RIAA lawsuits against individual
file sharers would not benefit musicians and songwriters. At the same
time, Rainie and Madden (2004) noted that almost two-thirds of
the survey group felt that the companies who owned and operated
peer-to-peer networks should be held responsible for individual file
sharers. Although the RIAA originally believed mass lawsuits would
discourage piracy and keep their business model afloat, the targeting
of anonymous file sharers resulted in a decline in music sales and
severe public criticism of their litigation strategy.
The RIAA subsequently switched to sending threatening
letters to those accused of illegally sharing music (EFF, 2008). These
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letters offered file sharers an opportunity to settle disputes, and, as a
result, the RIAA was able to collect amounts averaging $3,000 (EFF,
2008). This litigation strategy pushed the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia to overturn the decision in Verizon v. RIAA and
moved to prevent the RIAA from using its federal subpoena power
(Bhattacharjee et al., 2006). On January 21, 2004, the RIAA began
filing a series of lawsuits against unidentified “John Doe” defendants
by employing investigators to find individuals uploading copyrighted
music to peer-to-peer networks via an IP address. The investigators
later revealed the identities of the anonymous defendants (Goel et
al., 2010; Grodzinsky & Tavani, 2005). By 2008, the RIAA was able
to target and prosecute over 35,000 individuals accused of illegal file
sharing (Mitchell et al., 2018). However, due to significant public
backlash from the RIAA litigation war, the recording industry
organization announced later in the year that they would be putting
an end to the lawsuits (EFF, 2008). As a result, instead of targeting
developers of file sharing services or individual file sharers, the RIAA
announced that they would focus their efforts on the most egregious
copyright infringers—those who possessed and uploaded large
numbers of pirated files to the Internet (Goel et al., 2010; Rainie,
Mudd, Madden, & Hess, 2004). Despite their effort to identify and
sue the worst pirates, the rising popularity of the BitTorrent protocol
forced the recording industry to usher in an additional phase of mass
John Doe litigation (Sag, 2016).
Litigation decentralizes the file sharing process. A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. resulted in the decentralization of the file
sharing process and the rise of file sharing utilities. First implemented
in 2001, the BitTorrent protocol was a method developed to share
files via direct peer-to-peer connections with outside hosts (Kash,
Lai, Zhang, & Zohar, 2012). Although BitTorrent was originally
designed to distribute legal downloads, such as open source software
and commercial video games, the technology granted its users the
ability to exchange pirated content (McKinney & Renaud, 2011).
Under BitTorrent, the “seeders,” often referred to as individuals who
share complete files stored on their computers, utilize torrent websites
to upload files that are then divided into a large number of small
information packets (Chan, 2017). As a user’s download progresses,
a portion of these file packets is downloaded from the original seeder
to the user’s hard drive. The user also acquires additional information
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packets from other users downloading the same file. Users receive
packets while sharing their data with others attempting to download
the same file, thus expediting the original file transfer process.
BitTorrent users were capable of uploading and down-loading
information packets simultaneously (Giblin, 2011). The increased
efficiency of file sharing caused BitTorrent to rise in popularity;
“within a year of starting the company, files shared on Bit-Torrent
made up more than a third of all traffic on the internet” (Pierce, 2018,
para. 1). Sun (2018) noted that the availability of free music on peerto-peer networks such as BitTorrent remains the main push towards
peer-to-peer file sharing. Presently, BitTorrent is accessed by 170
million users each month (BitTorrent, 2018).
The efficiency of BitTorrent, paired with its ability to acquire
music for free, enticed many music downloaders to illegally share
copyrighted music (Karunaratne, 2012), but BitTorrent software
providers were not sued for copyright infringement (Bridy, 2009).
Bridy (2009) argued that filing lawsuits against companies such as
BitTorrent has no impact on illegal file sharing. BitTorrent does not
rely on a single server; each user’s computer is connected indirectly
to every other user’s computer via the Internet (Karunaratne, 2012).
Not storing data on a central server protected BitTorrent from antipiracy efforts because it did not host actual copyrighted content; the
content moved continuously between multiple computers. PeñaPorras (2018) noted that previous attempts made by the recording
industry to terminate piracy-supporting websites only resulted in
the sprouting of newer websites that replaced those that were shut
down. The legal measures originally intended to benefit the recording
industry ultimately resulted in the decentralization of the file sharing
process, and, as a result, the recording industry was defeated by its
own attempts to prevent music piracy (Sun, 2018). The decentralized
BitTorrent system rendered the recording industry incapable of
maintaining dominance over file-sharing technology (Fuller, 2018).
The recording industry subsequently invested in developing viable
music methods to properly compensate artists for their work, in the
hope of effectively combating piracy (Gopal et al., 2004).
Music streaming services. Literature indicates that the
development of fee-based download services can be used to combat
music piracy. In contrast to illegal file sharing, on-demand streaming
services allow consumers to listen to a comprehensive library
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without purchasing individual music products (Wlömert & Papies,
2015). Streaming services generate revenue either by charging
users a subscription fee to access their comprehensive libraries (i.e.,
paid streaming service) or by subsidizing free streaming services by
selling advertising to yield a profit (i.e., free streaming service). In
2018, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
(IFPI) estimated that 86% of consumers accessed music through ondemand streaming services. Despite the growing popularity of music
streaming, services such as these remain problematic to artists in the
recording industry.
Music streaming services hurt physical sales. Both the
recording industry and the research community have analyzed
the impacts of on-demand streaming services on recording artists’
revenues. Although streaming services were originally intended to
deter piracy, Marshall (2015) showed that recording artists believe
on-demand streaming services pose a great threat to both digital and
physical music sales. Research indicates that both fee-based and free
streaming services can appeal to artists’ pre-existing customers, who
prefer streaming to physical purchases of music (Wlömert & Papies,
2015). Wlömert and Papies (2015) also noted that consumers of paid
subscription services are even less likely to make physical purchases of
music, preferring to have access to the plentiful catalog of music their
streaming service offers. This is particularly detrimental to artists
who generate less revenue from streaming services than from physical
sales of their music. Artists have been forced to accept that consumers
are less willing to purchase their creative works when cheaper musiclistening methods, such as streaming services, are available to them as
an alternative.
Music streaming services increase the likelihood of music
piracy. Research suggests that music-streaming services negatively
impact artists’ revenues and encourage music piracy. Aguiar and
Waldfogel (2018) used a regression analysis of 2013 top track sales
and found that the streaming service Spotify supported music piracy.
Borja, Dieringer, and Daw (2014) noted that frequent users of music
streaming have the technical proficiency to illegally download music
and are comfortable with using the technology to engage in music
piracy. They found that utilizing music streaming services increases
the likelihood of engaging in music piracy by about 20%. Borja and
Dieringer (2016) stated that streaming services provide users with the
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technology to discover and listen to new music releases, which in turn
compels them to seek access to new tracks illegally. Though music
streaming is a less expensive alternative to purchasing music works,
illegal file sharing is still rampant within the recording industry.
MUSO (2017), a global piracy data monitor, found that “access to
piracy websites for music dramatically surged in 2017, increasing to
73.9 billion visits: a 14.7 percent increase from 2016” (para. 8). In
addition to the revenue losses sustained from decreasing music
sales, artists also experience great difficulties in earning money from
streaming services.
Music streaming services insufficiently distribute
royalties to artists. Under the recording industry’s previous
business model, artists were compensated with a percentage of each
sale of their musical works (Hanus, 2018). Digital music streaming
changed how artists and songwriters earn revenue for their work
today. Interactive digital streaming services, such as Spotify,
currently distribute royalty payments to artists using a per-stream
model, otherwise known as service-centric licensing (Dimont,
2018). Service-centric licensing pays royalties to artists “perstream,” but streaming-service users pay a flat subscription rate, thus
resulting in a cross-subsidization between high-streaming users and
low-streaming users. Under this model, money is distributed by
dividing the total revenue by the number of times a musical work is
streamed on the platform. Revenue is dependent on the streaming
platform’s number of subscribers, regardless of the number of times
a musical work is played (Marshall, 2015). Some artists receive
minimal compensation, even when their music is very popular.
In 2018, a data visualization organization, Information
is Beautiful, found that the average per-stream royalty to music
rights holders was $0.0007 to $0.0190 (Information is Beautiful,
2018). The low average payout per stream is not only paid to
artists, but all rights holders of the work (Dimont, 2018). As
a result, artists receive an even smaller fraction of the stream
payout after the record label, producers, and songwriters have
all taken their cut. In previous decades, parties within the
recording industry used a business model in which artists were
compensated with a percentage of each album or individual song
they sold (Hanus, 2018). Streaming services have resulted in a
significant royalty loss for artists.
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Inadequate compensation for artists. After the MP3
file format was created, consumers were able to easily distribute
copyrighted works. Widespread piracy ensued, and the recording
industry responded by creating music-streaming services. Although
streaming services offer royalties to rights holders, they distribute
inadequate compensation to artists. Spotify and other interactive
streaming services use service-centric licensing, a flawed system that
pays rights-holders each time their work is streamed (Dimont, 2018).
Kretschmer (2000) analyzed streaming service income distribution
and noted, “Very few artists can expect to have a sizeable income
from royalties” (p. 217). Today, artists are not satisfied with their
organizational reward. Marshall (2015) wrote:
Artists are thus being told that they are wrong to treat streams
like sales that they should adopt a patient, long run view. Yet,
while large labels with cash reserves to potentially ride out
the storm, artists who need money to live on now argue that
streaming is undermining their current income by cutting
into their digital sales. (p. 183)
Presently, the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music
Modernization Act (MMA) is legislation that describes royalty
distribution on streaming services. The MMA created a council of
publishers that issue blanket licenses to digital music services and
later collect and distribute those royalties to artists (LaFrance, 2018).
This licensing collective also provides increased protections for pre1972 recordings as well as to music publishers and engineers. The
MMA allows rate court judges to consider sound recording royalties
when adjusting public performance royalties for music streaming.
As the royalties for sound recordings are typically greater than those
for public performance, rate court judges have the power to set the
amount of royalties paid for live performances closer to those paid for
sound recordings, which benefits the artist. Despite these benefits,
this new legislation is limited in scope because it only addresses
licensed uses of artists’ works.
Today, there is no system that adequately rewards an artist for
each instance a consumer streams one of their music tracks. YouTube
is considered the most popular streaming service worldwide, with 1.5
billion monthly users (McIntrye, 2018). YouTube generates revenue
in the form of advertisements by monetizing content, such as music
and sound recordings, providing artists with very little or no financial
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compensation. YouTube is able to earn large sums of money from
advertisements on unlicensed recordings, music that the rights
holders have not granted the use of, while paying little or no money to
the artist involved (LaFrance, 2018).
In 2017, the IFPI found that 85% of its monthly users
accessed YouTube for music streaming. Despite its popularity,
YouTube is a streaming service that offers the lowest reward to
rights holders, with an average artist revenue of $0.0007 per play
(Information is Beautiful, 2018). Artists must have a substantial
number of streams to be adequately compensated for their work;
Peter Frampton, the artist behind the best-selling album of 1976,
Frampton Comes Alive, has explained that “For 55 million streams of
“Baby I Love Your Way,” I got $1,700” (Frampton, 2018; RIAA, n.d.).
An artist seeking to earn the monthly minimum wage of $1472
would need their music streamed 2.1 million times on YouTube
(Information is Beautiful, 2018).
CONCLUSION
Previous attempts made to deter widespread music piracy
have failed. Early responses to copyright infringement, such as
aggressive litigation and the development of music streaming services,
have created new challenges for artists. Legal action taken as a response
to piracy resulted in a decentralization of the file sharing process and
loss of sales as well as damage to public opinion. Although originally
intended to offset the loss of revenue from copyright infringement,
streaming services instead have negatively impacted sales and proven
ineffective against music piracy. Streaming services distribute low
royalty payments based on advertisements and subscriptions, which
are often drastically divided before creators are paid for their works.
Although music streaming is a convenient option for consumers, it
can often lead to inadequate compensation for artists.
Copyright law is the legal platform designed to protect
intellectual property, yet rapid technological advancements have
challenged the effectiveness of this legislation in the United States.
At present, the MMA attempts to address these problems by
modernizing copyright law to include streaming services. Although
this legislation facilitates a better distribution of royalties on music
streaming platforms, MMA also has limitations regarding unlicensed
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uses of artists’ works on hosting sites. LaFrance (2018) noted that
a significant limitation of MMA is that it does not address hosting
sites such as YouTube. Streaming services continue to negatively
impact royalty distribution. For this reason, it is imperative that we
address these issues through revision of copy-right law to develop
a viable streaming model that adequately compensates artists of
generations to come.
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